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Great Response to Cirrus Bashing Following Latest Incident...

Following the latest (semi-)sucessful chute deployment, many pilots have again taken not only the plane design and pilot to task but also the passenger the deployed the chute... Here is a GREAT post by a COPA member on the AOPA forum that very clearly refuting the safety claims that many are making:

Cirrus SR2X fatal accident and parachute activation history

As a long-time Cirrus owner and AOPA volunteer, let me contribute some analysis of the accident history of the Cirrus SR2X fleet. The recent parachute deployment in the fatal accident off Eagle Creek airport near Indianapolis fueled lots of interest and discussion.
Cirrus Fatal Accident Rate
For the record, since 2001 there have been 19 fatal accidents in production Cirrus aircraft and 39 people have perished. Way too many for lots of reasons worth examining, but the trend is changing (see below).
In the same time, there have been 9 CAPS parachute activations, in which 17 people have been saved and 2 fatalities (included above).
After two fatal accidents within 5 days in January 2003, the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association, Cirrus Design and our insurers focused on a concerted effort to improve pilot safety, training and decision making. The COPA Critical Decision Making seminar, the Single Pilot Resource Management module at CPPP (Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program), and the Cirrus Design CSIP (Cirrus Standardized Instructor Program) instructor designation all focus on risk management and decision making.
By that time in early 2003, there had been 6 fatal accidents in a fleet of less than 1,000 planes that had flown for less than 200,000 hours. That's 3 fatal accidents per 100,000 flying hours, almost triple the General Aviation rate around 1.3!
Since 2003, there have been 13 more fatal accidents while the fleet has grown to over 2,500 planes and the flying time expanded to approximately 1,400,000 flying hours. Now the overall accident rate is about 1.36 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours and the most recent annual rates are 1.06, 1.24 and 1.04 for 2004, 2005, and 2006 YTD respectively. Those rates are below the overall GA fatal accident rate that has hovered around 1.3. (Curious, the Nall report claims a rate in 2004 of 1.2 but the Bureau of Transportation Statistics has higher rates.)
Here Is a chart that plots these rates. Note the initial bad news followed by a significant improvement trend following 2003.

The trend encourages me that we have the right focus on risk management and decision-making to take better advantage of the safety features engineered into the airplane. However, as Cirrus Design grows by encouraging new people into aviation, seen by many as a "real good thing" but accompanied by significant challenges, we are not going to run out of new pilots with whom to address these issues. But, IMHO, the health of General Aviation needs the new blood and responses to the challenges.
CAPS Parachute Activation History
Following the Indianapolis parachute activation, many posts debated the merits and issues surrounding this unique emergency option.
CAPS stands for the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System and consists of a ballistic rocket-fired parachute that extracts a large round parachute attached to the airframe. The rocket ensures that the parachute will deploy successfully despite the attitude of the airframe in flight, such as a spin or while inverted. The parachute inflates slowly and the risers are reefed to ensure a rapid transition to stable attitude under canopy. Tests demonstrate that within 8 seconds, all forward velocity is reduced to zero (relative to wind) and descent occurs at about 1700 fpm or 17 knots. The parachute deployment airspeed was demonstrated at Vpd of 133 knots. One CAPS deployment occurred successfully at higher speed, perhaps 190 knots, and one deployment failed at speeds estimated at over 240 knots.

Here is a synopsis of all of the known 9 CAPS parachute activations. I summarize each deployment by year, location and injuries, then describe the factors that lead to the activation, the activation scenario, and the landing scenario.
CAPS pull #1, Oct 2002, Lewisville, TX, 1 uninjured
Factors: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error
Activation: low altitude, 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane
Landing: bushes near golf course
CAPS pull #2, April 2004, Lethbridge, AB, Canada, 4 uninjured
Factors: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, SR20 performance
Activation: high altitude, deployment upon loss of control
Landing: landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers
CAPS pull #3, April 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL, 1 uninjured
Factors: confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system
Activation: low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation
Landing: landed in trees
CAPS pull #4, Sept 2004, Peters, CA, 2 uninjured
Factors: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery
Activation: high altitude, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet
Landing: landed in walnut grove
CAPS pull #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA, 1 fatality
Factors: IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots
Activation: uncertain if intentional activation or due to airframe stress in high speed descent, CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site
Landing: high speed impact in mountainous area
CAPS pull #6, June 2005, Haverstraw, NY, 1 serious injury (compression fracture of vertabrae)
Factors: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs
Activation: low altitude, last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots)
Landing: water, bay of Hudson River
CAPS pull #7, Jan 2006, Childersburg, AL, 3 uninjured
Factors: IMC, severe icing, loss of control
Activation: high altitude, icing report at 9,000 feet IMC
Landing: flat terrain
CAPS pull #8, Feb 2006, Wagner, SD, 2 uninjured
Factors: IMC, shortly after takeoff, pilot disorientation
Activation: low altitude
Landing: flat terrain
CAPS pull #9, Aug 2006, Indianapolis, IN, 1 fatality, 3 serious injuries (spinal surgery)
Factors: IMC, pilot incapacitation, 2.5 miles from departure airport
Activation: low altitude, possibly first activation of CAPS by non-pilot, possibly not fully deployed
Landing: water, pond among residential housing
Don't just take my word for it. Review the NTSB database documents. Read the Nall report on aviation safety.
But just as we have made some advances in aviation safety through technology and training, so too do we need to make advances in our discussions about the circumstances and accident chains that lead to fatal accidents. Thanks for reading this far!
Cheers
Rick